WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(2)/刘成伟(27)
However, the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44) observes that, “[w]hile we consider that the Non-violation remedy should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy, each case should be examined on its own merits, bearing in mind the above-mentioned need to safeguard the process of negotiating reciprocal tariff concessions. Our role as a panel charged with examining claims under Article XXIII:1(b) is, therefore, to make an objective assessment of whether, in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances in the matter before us, particular measures taken by Japan have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(b)”.11 And in next section an insight is taken into those common elements that have been reviewed by the panels or the Appellate Body charged with examining claims under Art. XXIII:1(b).
On the other hand, the Non-violation remedy prescribed in Art. XXIII:1(b) has given rise to controversy. While numerous commentators, together with various panels or the Appellate Body, have referred to the non-violation language of Art. XXIII:1(b) as a clause to maintain the balance of interests among members; others characterize the idea of allowing for non-violation complaints as superfluous at best, condemning it as a “useless and dangerous construction”, and many lawyers are reluctant to accept the concept of non-violation as legitimate.
总共85页
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 27
[28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] 上一页 下一页