WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(2)/刘成伟(28)
Indeed, one could consider non-violation complaints a necessary ingredient of a system that primarily serves as a forum for negotiations but fear that liberal usage of the provision will result in harassment complaints based more on domestic political concerns than on any true wrong-doing by the respondent member. In fact, past practices of the GATT/WTO develop an equitable branch of good faith doctrine, known as the protection of legitimate expectations（to be scrutinized in next section）, to avoid the abuse of non-violation remedy.
To sum up, “the availability of Article XXIII:1(b) complaints can operate as a moral hazard in the dispute settlement procedures. Panels that are faced with a politically difficult interpretative issue or are internally divided can be tempted to refer the complaining WTO member to its procedural rights under Article XXIII:1(b) rather than confirming its substantive rights. By adopting that approach they spare the party complained against of the opprobrium of illegality, open the door to a negotiated settlement between the parties to the dispute, and accord the complaining party the right to retaliate should no settlement be reached--a solution that can be attractive to a pragmatically minded member of a panel or the Appellate Body seeking to avoid a difficult legal issue”.12
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