WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(2)/刘成伟(64)
If non-violation represents an extension of the good faith requirements in the implementation of a treaty and can also be applied to good faith and error in negotiations under the GPA, and we think it can, then the special remedies for non-violation contained in DSU Article 26 should also be applied rather than the traditional remedies of treaty law which are not apposite to the situation of the GPA.”
(iv) Benefits under Successive Rounds
In Japan-Film, the question of legitimate expectations of benefits accruing to the United States is complicated by the fact that the United States was claiming to have expectations of improved market access benefits in respect of four different products (each under a different tariff line), granted during three successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The United States claims to have reasonable expectations of benefits accruing to it under Art. XXIII:1(b) as the result of tariff concessions granted by Japan on black and white film and paper during the Kennedy Round (1967), on colour and black and white film and paper during the Tokyo Round (1979) and on colour and black and white film and paper during the Uruguay Round (1994). Japan argues that the reasonable expectations of the United States must be limited to those existing in 1994 at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in that these latter expectations reflected a new balance and global reassessment of the value of market access concessions, replacing any reasonable expectations that might have arisen under prior tariff negotiations.
总共85页
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