简明反垄断法法英文指南/赵庆庆译(19)
在一个集中的市场上，只有少数的几家公司。此类市场的威胁在于这些少数的几家公司可能发现通过串谋来限制竞争是很容易的。如，他们可能在对消费者索取的价格上达成一致。这种串谋可以是一个很明显的协定，也可能是以较为隐蔽的方式。较知名的方式有tacit coordination or coordinated interaction 较之鉴定明显的协定，公司可能更倾向于采用沉默式的合作，因为默示的协定通常很难被发现，况且一些公开的协定还可能会遭受刑事指控。
When a merger enables a single firm to increase prices without coordinating with its competitors, it has created a unilateral effect. A firm might be able to increase prices unilaterally if it has a large enough share of the market, if the merger removes its closest competitor, and if the other firms in the market can’t provide substantial competition.
当一项合并使个别公司在没有与其竞争者协调的情况下提价，这只是会产生单方面的影响。倘若一家公司拥有足够大的市场份额，倘若其合并排挤了最主要的市场竞争者，倘若市场上其它的公司无法与之进行实质性的竞争，那么该公司就可能有能力单方面地提高价格。
Generally, at least two conditions are necessary for a merger to have a likely anticompetitive effect: The market must be substantially concentrated after the merger; and it must be difficult for new firms to enter the market in the near term and provide effective competition. The reason for the second condition is that firms are less likely to raise prices to anticompetitive levels if it is fairly easy for new competitors to enter the market and drive prices down.
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