激励、信息与经济机制(经济与金融高级研究丛书)
编号：31698
书名：激励、信息与经济机制(经济与金融高级研究丛书)
作者：田国强著
出版社：北大
出版时间：2000-10-1
入库时间：2007-11-21
定价：56元
[图书内容简介]
本书主要讨论经济机制设计中的信息效率和激励相容问题。全书分6个部分：1．在纳什策略均衡行为下的激励机制设计。2.在公有制或混合经济环境下的激励机制如何导致资源的有效配置。3．在信息不完全情况下的激励机制设计。4．在某种特殊的经济环境类中分散化的经济机制如何实现帕累托最优配置。5．瓦尔拉斯配置、林道配置的双执行。6．信息效率。
[图书目录]
Acknolegements 1
前言
Part I Nash Implementation Of Lindahl and Wall"Itsian AllOcations
1． Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence bv a
Single—Valued，Feasible，and ContinUOUS Mechanism，Revew 0f
EconomiStudies56：613—621，1989 3
2．Completely Feasl’ble and Continuous Implementation 0f the
Lindahl Correspondence with a Message Space 0f Minimal
Dimension，journal ofEconomic Thery，5l：443—452，1990 12
3·Implementation 0f Lindahl A110cations with Nontotal—Nontransitive
Preferences，journal 0fPubliEconoynics
46：247—259，1991 22
4· Implementation。f the Walrasian Correspondence without
Continuous，Convex，and ordered Preferences．Social
Choicand Wezfare9：117—130，1992 35
5·Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism，
journal of Mattemcticia Economics，22：169—179．
1993 49
6．Nash—Implementation of the LindahI Correspondence with
Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies(with Qi Li and
S．Nakarnura)，Internatinal Ecorlomic Review．
36：37—52，1995 6n
7．On Nash—Implementation in the Presence of Withholding
(with Qi Li)，Garues and Economic Behavior
9：222—233，1995 76
Part II Implemelltable State alld Mixed owller$hip Systems
8．Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocatbns，
journal ofECOnOTFlic Thery，64：568—584，1994 91
9．An Implementable State—Ownership Systern with General Variable
Returns(with Qi Li)，Journal of ECOtlOmiTheory.
64：286—297，1994 108
10．Ratio—Lindahl Equilibria and an InformatiorlaUy Efficient and
Implementable Mixed—Ownership System(with Qi Li)，
journal 0fEconomic Behauior and 0rganization，
26：391—411，1995 120
Part III Bayesian Implementation
1 1．Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational一Expectations
Lindahl AUocatiorls，Games and Economic Behavior，
16：135—151，1996 143
12．Bayesian Implementation in Exchallge Economies with State
Dependent Preferenees and Feasible Sets，Social Choice
and Wefare，16：99—119，1999 160
1 3．Virtual Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments
with Infinite Alternatives and Types，JOUrnal of
Matematical Economics，28：313—339，1997 181
Part IV Existence of optimal Truth-Dominant Mechallisms
14．On the Existence of 0ptimal Truth—Dominant Mechanisms，
Eco．oreic5 Letters，53：17—24，1996 2ll
15．A Characterization of the Existence of Optl。mal Dominant Strategy
Mechanisms(with Liqun I。iu)，Rew钯叫of ECOnOmic Design，
4：205—218，1999 219
Part V Double Implemelltation in Nash alld StrOilg Nash Equilibria
16．DOHble Implementation in ECOFIOmies with Production
Technologies Unknown to the Designer，Economic
Theorv，13：689—707，1999 235，
17·Double Implementation of Lindahl Allocations bv a Pure
Mechanism，S0cialChoiceand Welfare．
17：125—141，2000 254
1 8·Implementation of Balanced Linear Cost Share Equilibrium
SolUtl’On in Nash and Strong Nash EquiIibria 271
1 9·Incentive Mechanism Design for Pr0duction Economies with
Both Private and PubIic Ownerships 295
20．DOHble Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium
Allocatioris 323
Part VI Informational and Efficiency of Mechanisms
2 1·On InfOrmational Efficiency and Incentive Aspects of Generallized
Ratio Equilibria，JOLlrYlClZ of MathematiciaEconomics
23：323—337，1994 343
22．On Uniqueness of InfOrmational Efficilency of the Competitive
Mecham‘sm in PrOduction Economies 358
23．A Unique InfOrmatiorlally Efficient A110cation Mechanism
in Economies wi’th Public Goods 383
本书共有411页